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Michihito Yoshime
 
Introduction: What is the problem of können?
1 The opening passage of §16 of the Transcendental Deduction section in the second edition
of Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most famous from Kant’s entire works. Namely:
It  must  be  possible  for  the  ‘I  think’  to  accompany  all  my  representations;  for
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all,
and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at
least would be nothing to me (B131-132; Kemp Smith [1929] 2007, pp. 152-153).1
2 This  translation  by  Norman  Kemp  Smith  seems  more  precise  and  explicit  in  its
interpretation of the first sentence compared to the vague implication of the original
German text:
Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können… (B131)
3 First,  Kemp Smith omitted Kant’s stress on ‘Ich denke’  and ‘können’.2 Additionally, and
more importantly, he chose ‘be possible’ as the translation for ‘können’, while there are
other possible candidates here. This becomes clearer if compared with, for instance, the
following recent translations:
The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations... (B131; Pluhar
1996, p. 177).
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations… (B131; Guyer and
Wood 1998, p. 246)
4 It  is understandable that  a number of  different translations have been employed for
‘können’. Due to differences in the syntactic rules for auxiliary verbs between German
and English, if ‘können’ were simply replaced with the English equivalent, namely, ‘can’,
this would yield a solecism. However, this would make no difference given that Kant’s use
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of können would not substantially change the meaning of this text. In that case, what Kant
intended to express in this passage would remain the same with or without this auxiliary
verb or, at the very least, this use of können would not be inconsistent with his conclusion
regarding  the  characteristics  of  the  transcendental  apperception in  the  A-deduction.
Additionally, you can remove this auxiliary verb from the sentence without causing any
solecism.
5 Still, it should be noted that this opening sentence is not the only one where Kant uses
‘können’.  In  actuality,  he  repeats  similar  modal  expressions  right  up  until  the  next
section, whereas the corresponding parts of the A-deduction seldom have it. Above all, he
emphasizes the word können by spacing it out as he spaces out Ich denke. As the latter is
the key phrase of the entire section, the former is also likely to be important to him.
6 Thus, it is likely that he actually added some substantial meaning with the word können.
Apparently, it suggests that he changed his view on pure apperception from that of the A-
deduction because,  there,  he had consistently argued concerning “transcendental  (or
pure, original) apperception” involving not the necessity of possibility, but the necessity
itself of one and the same self-consciousness,  in which the threefold synthesis of the
manifold should be accomplished. If this is the case, this auxiliary verb should constitute
the key to comprehending the difference between the two versions of Kant’s doctrine of
transcendental apperception.
7 While  a  large  number  of  studies  have  been  made  on  Kant’s  doctrine  concerning
apperception, including the meaning of können, many recent scholars do not regard it as
being central to our interpretation of either edition. For example, Patricia Kitcher argues
that  that  opening  sentence  is  the  essential  point  of  the  B-deduction, and  it  is  the
equivalent of the A-deduction’s “principle of apperception,” that is: “All representations
must (if cognition is possible) belong to a single self-consciousness” (Kitcher 2011, p. 125).
8 However, such a simplifying reading does not seem to provide a satisfactory account of
the necessity of können, which Kant himself emphasized. In this paper, therefore, I would
like to focus my attention on the meaning and origin of the word können. I will do this
with reference to Fichte’s view on the issue. Some scholars, including Henry E. Allison,
have already investigated the meaning of können within Kant’s own writings. My main
interest here consists, rather, in how and to what extent Fichte’s view of apperception
differs from that of Kant.
 
1. The word können as redundant
9 Even if different readings of the word können did not harm the consistency of Kant’s
argument for the necessary unity of apperception, what the notion represents should be
explained. The simplest explanation is to see it as having no substantial sense, as simply
being an auxiliary word used to adjust the tone of a sentence. On this reading, Kant would
mean simply that the I think must actually accompany all my representations. If this is
misleading,  it  would  be  because  of  Kant’s  carelessness.  I  do  not  believe  that  this
explanation has broad support, but the classic commentary by H. J. Paton does seem to
adopt it. Paton mainly follows Kant’s argument by means of the A-deduction and uses
passages of the B-deduction as supplementary explanation, as needed. So, he apparently
finds no substantial  difference between them, but is a little puzzled by “Kant’s usual
carelessness in terminology” (Paton [1936] 2011, p. 380n4).
The Problem of “können” in Kant’s B-Deduction and Its Significance for Fichte
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 17 | 2018
2
10 As for more recent works, as I see it, we can find at least two different ways to understand
können. First, it could represent the nature of transcendental apperception as a function
or faculty. Kant calls transcendental apperception “the function by means of which this
manifold [of the representations] is synthetically combined into one cognition” (A108;
Guyer  and  Wood  1998,  233,  my  supplement),  “a  common  function  of  the  mind  for
combining it in one representation,” (A109; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 233) or “the radical
faculty of all our cognition” (A114; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 236). The recent translations
of können as ‘be able to’ or ‘be capable of’ also seem to support such a reading. According
to this reading, that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations is almost
equivalent  to the fact  that  transcendental  apperception must  be able to  unify all  my
representations. And it must be able to do so, if empirical cognition is possible at all. Kant
writes as follows:
[N]o cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that
unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to
which  all  representation  of  objects  is  alone  possible.  This  pure,  original,
unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception (A107; Guyer
and Wood 1998, p. 232).
[I]ndeed, it  is  through those conditions [of the necessary unity of apperception]
that every cognition is first made possible (A110; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 234, my
supplement).
11 However,  what  makes  the  matter  complicated  here  is  that  the  modal  expression  of
possibility rarely appears in the A-deduction.  Instead,  Kant argues repeatedly for the
necessity of one self-consciousness, that is, for transcendental apperception: 
[T]he original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same
time  a  consciousness  of  an  equally  necessary  unity  of  the  synthesis  of  all
appearances… (A108; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 233)
All  empirical  consciousness…has  a  necessary  relation  to  a  transcendental
consciousness (preceding all  particular experience),  namely the consciousness of
myself,  as  original  apperception.  It  is  therefore absolutely necessary that in my
cognition all consciousness belong to one consciousness (of myself) (A117n; Guyer
and Wood 1998, p. 237).
12 Apparently, these passages affirm that transcendental apperception must actually unify
all the representations in empirical consciousness. And given that the A-deduction could
be read as consistent with the opening phrase of §16 of the B-deduction, we should have a
basis for eliminating können. Some scholars, including Kitcher, seem to share this reading.
The  word  können,  which  should  represent  the  function  or  faculty  of  transcendental
apperception,  becomes  redundant  once  the  actuality  of  experience  is  given  in  the
argument, because then the function or faculty must have already been activated. And
this actuality is, in fact, presupposed by Kant as the starting point of the whole argument
of CPR.  His chief concern in this is,  of course,  how synthetic a priori propositions (as
cognition)  are  possible  (cf.  B73).  He  then assumes  that  logic,  mathematics  and pure
natural science “traveled the secure path of a science” (BX; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 107).
He is not here tackling the enormous problem of whether cognition is at all possible.
13 In my opinion, however, such a reading does not provide a satisfactory account of the
meaning of the word können or, strictly, Kant’s emphasis on it by repeating similar modal
expressions in the B-deduction. It seems that this auxiliary verb is not redundant. 
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2. The word können as representing probability
14 Another reading of the passage in question, which I would like to support,  is that of
understanding können as  representing no more than the possibility of  transcendental
apperception. Henry Allison, for instance, seems to understand it in this way when he
says,  “Kant maintains that it  must be possible,  for the “I  think” to accompany them
[representations],  even if  it  does not always actually do so” (Allison 2015,  p.  335,  my
supplement). In that sense, Allison’s view of the auxiliary verb looks to be near to Kemp
Smith’s  translation,  namely,  ‘possible’,  though he chose “be able” (ibid.)  for  his  own
translation of that sentence. This possibility does not represent the function or faculty
and  is,  therefore,  not  redundant  even  under  the  condition  that  the  necessity  of
experience  is  given.  It,  rather,  represents  a  kind  of  probability  of  the  I  think that
accompanies all my representations. In other words, Kant affirms, with können placed not
only in the sentence at issue but also in that section and the following sections, that it is
also possible for the I think not to accompany my representations. If so, then it is also
understandable  that  Kant  seems  to  have  stressed  and  repeated  the  expression,
particularly given that this is one of the most important points changed from the A-
deduction. What is, then, the content of this change?
15 Allison  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  distinction  between  sensibility  and
understanding here. According to him, Kant cannot simply argue that the I think must
actually accompany all my representations, since these include sensible intuitions that
are not thought (ibid, p. 337).3 In short, we are not always thinking “I, I, I….”. Kant has
already made what seems to be the same point in the A-deduction’s stronger argument:
This [one self-] consciousness may often only be weak, so that we connect it with
the  generation  of  the  representation  only  in  the  effect,  but  not  in  the  act  [of
synthesis]  itself,  i.e.,  immediately;  but  regardless  of  these  differences  one
consciousness  must  always  be  found,  even  if  it  lacks  conspicuous  clarity…
(A103-104; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 231, my supplement)
16 However, strictly speaking, this passage does not mean exactly the same as: “It must be
possible  for  the ‘I  think’  to accompany all  my representations…” (B131;  Kemp Smith
[1929]  2007,  p.  152),  where this  is  read as  expressing the probability  of  the I  think’s
accompanying all my representations. In the Transcendental Dialectic of the first edition,
criticizing the “Third paralogism of personality,” he states:
[I]n the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as
belonging to the unity of my Self, and it is all the same whether I say that this whole
time is  in  Me,  as  an individual  unity,  or  that  I  am to be found with numerical
identity, in all of this time (A362; Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 423).
17 There he also uses the phrase “the I think accompanies — and indeed with complete
identity — all representations at every time in my consciousness” (A362-363; ibid.). Thus,
at least for Kant in the first edition, the lack of I think in some of my representations is not
exactly the same as one and the same self-consciousness being weak at times. Kitcher,
rightly, describes this contrast as the difference between “togetherness” and “mineness”.
According to her, what Kant tries to show is “how different mental states can be unified
in a single self  and not how an individual  can attribute a particular mental  state to
himself” (Kitcher 2011, p. 124). Although she regards this principle as common to both
editions, it seems to apply better to the B-deduction. Certainly, Kant also refers in the B-
deduction to the “same subject” (B132, Guyer and Wood 1998, p. 246) or a “universal self-
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consciousness” (ibid. p. 247), in which all representations are to be unified. But in the
following paragraphs,  in contrast  to the A-deduction,  he prefers  the expression “the
transcendental  unity  of  apperception”  to  “the  transcendental  (or  pure,  original)
apperception”.
18 Thus, if one employs the second, and to me appropriate, reading that können represents
probability, then the contrast between the two editions on transcendental apperception,
or one and the same self-consciousness, also becomes clearer. It seems that in the B-
deduction Kant revised his claim concerning transcendental apperception (one and the
same self-consciousness) and the identity of the I, to a somewhat weaker or more modest
one. That is, he dropped “mineness” in favor of “togetherness”. This might suggest that
Kant changed the focus of his argument on the issue, namely from the aspect of ratio
essendi to that of ratio cognoscendi, just like he did later in his Grounding of Grounding for the
Metaphysics of Morals and the second Critique (cf. Allison 2015, p. 230).4 If so, however, why
did he need to make the transition? I would like to investigate the reason for this not
within his own writings but, rather, with regard to Fichte’s view on this issue.
 
3. Why is Kant’s argument unsatisfactory to Fichte?
19 Although  his  Wissenschaftslehre itself  was  established  through  his  meditation  upon
Reinhold’s Elementary Philosophy and Schulze’s Aenesidemus, Fichte considered himself
to be a transcendental idealist,  completing the work that Kant should have done. He
states:
I have always said, and say it here again, that my system is no other than that of
Kant. That is, it includes the same view on the matter, but it is entirely independent
of Kant’s account in its process (EEWL, GA I/4, 184).5
Now I know very well that Kant has never established such a system…. However, I
surely believe myself as well to know that Kant might have thought such a system…
and that only under this condition his claims have meaning and a relevance (ZEWL,
GA I/4, 230).
20 In fact, Fichte often employs  Kant’s  terms or  arguments  while  he describes  his  own
system, namely Wissenschaftslehre, and the I think is no exception. In Zweite Einleitung in die
Wissenschaftslehre, he writes:
To  all,  what  is  thought  to  appear  in consciousness,  the  I  must  be  necessarily
thought in addition. In the explanation of the determination of mind, the I must not
be abstracted, or, as Kant expresses it: All my representations must be able to be
accompanied, [so must] be thought as accompanied, by the I think. (ZEWL, GA I/4,
253, my supplement)
21 Here Fichte paraphrased the equivalent of Kant’s sentence in the original passage without
the modality of possibility. So, at a glance, he also seems to think the word können is
redundant or dispensable. And he mentions this in defending his doctrine of the I and of
intellectual intuition. According to Fichte, the latter is not an immediate consciousness of
the thing in itself, but “of that I act, and what act I make [daß ich handle, und was ich
handle]” (ibid. 216). This intellectual intuition appears in every moment of everyone’s
consciousness; we cannot even walk without it (cf. ibid.). Therefore, Fichte also seems to
hold that the I think must actually accompany all my representations.
22 However, he also states that it is nonsense to think “I, I, I…” in all moments (cf. ibid. 253),
and, though in ZEWL no other passage on this issue appears, years later in WL1812, he re-
engages with können. There he states:
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Kant notes that the deduction of the categories can only be the establishment of the
principle of the self-relation of the consciousness, so precisely of the reflexibility….
The point of this deduction would be, namely, that it must be possible for the I think
to accompany all my representations [das: Ich denke muß alle meine Vorstellungen
begleiten können].... This können stands in the wrong part. It must have been: The
possibility of I think accompanies necessarily all my representations (WL1812,  GA
II/13, 102-103).
23 According to his argument, what must be accompanying my representations is, strictly
speaking,  not  the  I  think itself  but  the  “determined  reflexibility  [bestimmte
Reflexibilität]”  (ibid.  104),  which  becomes  I  think once  reflection  is  performed.  This
reflexibility must always accompany our representations, even if it remains inactivated
and subtle in one’s daily consciousness. The reason for this is clear: if there were no such
background, then we could not explain the source of the “mineness” (Kitcher 2011, 124)
that the I think should bear. Reflection is naturally self-referential, and the presupposition
that the I think comes from reflexibility correlates with Fichte’s view on the I and each
representation. Namely, representations are not the given but rather the end products of
the mutual limitation of the I and the not I, which occurs within the absolute I (cf. GWL, GA
1/2, 369-384). As is well known, Fichte later introduced the absolute (God) on top of the
absolute I, the highest principle of the Wissenschaftslehre in his Jena years. Additionally, his
late writings and lectures are rather abstruse due to their metaphysical tendencies and
frequent  use  of  visual  metaphors  such as  “image  [Bild]”,  “seeing  [Sehen]”,  or  “light
[Licht]”; for this reason, it becomes more difficult to contrast them with the arguments of
other philosophers, including Kant. For instance, Fichte also notes:
It must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations [Das Ich
denke muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können]. It might be true: however,
in a sense, it  totally disappears for us.  The I  accompanies all  seeing,  and is  the
original material of all seeing. (WL1812, GA II/13, 147)
24 We would need an account of the word seeing to fully understand this passage. Yet we can
safely say that his view of the relation between the I and representations remains the
same. The main point of this view consists in the idea that it “descends from the universal
[i.e. the I] to the special” (BWL, GA I/3, 145, my supplement), contrary to Kant who “starts
from the presupposition that a manifold is given for the possible reception to the unity of
consciousness” (ibid. 144). ‘I think’ for Fichte is primarily an expression of spontaneity,
and secondarily an expression of negativity, limitation, and receptivity. This is because
the predicate ‘think’ is a special determination of the subject ‘I’ in so far as it excludes all
other ways of being of the ‘I’ (cf. GWL, GA I/2, 298). Therefore, Fichte’s view of the I think is
nearer  to  the  A-deduction  than  the  B-deduction.  He  never  admits  the  possibility  of
thinking of “togetherness” of the self, to which the manifold of representations should be
unified, without there being a “mineness” of it. The latter is indispensable for Fichte,
because it is the very source of the former.
25 And the reason why Kant dropped this view is, as I see it, to avoid the risk of being taken
to  admit  intellectual  intuition.  Kant  consistently  understood  intellectual  intuition  as
being an immediate consciousness of the I as noumenon, that is, the thing in itself. The fact
that  he  prefers  the  expression  “the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception”  to  “the
transcendental  apperception”  in  the  B-deduction  also  suggests  the  reason  for  his
transition. As mentioned above, however, such a transition would be needed in so far as
intellectual intuition, as well as the I itself, should be understood to refer to being. In this
sense, Kant’s philosophy of the self is somehow ontological, and so lacks a viewpoint on
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human acts,6 which Fichte gave in his Wissenschaftslehre. Thus, for Fichte, Kant’s können is
an unnecessary compromise, and could ruin the view of the I, which stands at the center
of transcendental idealism.
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NOTES
1. In this paper, I will refer to English translations of CPR with the name of the translator
and the  year  of  publication  of  each  version,  to  distinguish  them from one  another.
Abbreviations: EEWL = Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 1797; GA = Gesamtausgabe
der  Bayerischen  Akademie  der  Wissenschafte;  GEWL  =  Grundriss  des  Eigenthümlichen  der
Wissenschaftslehre in Rucksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen, 1795/1802; GWL = Grundlage der
gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794/1802; WL1812 = Die Wissenschaftslehre [von 1812]; ZEWL =
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 1797.
2. I use italics for the words, which are spaced out or typed in boldface.
3. Allison also points out the importance of the imagination in the matter, for it is closely related
with apperception, and its role is also changed from that of the A-deduction.
4. )  In  the  former  he started  from  freedom  to  accomplish  the  deduction  of  the  categorical
imperative, and in the latter he introduced the consciousness of moral principle as a “fact of
reason”, and then claimed that this fact shows the practicality of pure reason as transcendental
freedom.
5. For the translation of Fichte’s writings, I take full responsibility.
6. )  A classic  reading of  Kant’s  self  by Heinz Heimsoeth apparently  admired this  ontological
tendency. On the other hand, some scholars including Friedrich Kaulbach try to interpret Kant’s
apperception as referring to the act of reason. In my opinion, the most thoroughgoing attempt at
such an interpretation is made by Fichte.
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ABSTRACTS
The present paper examines the problem of “können” at  the very beginning of  KrV § 16 by
offering a linguistic analysis of the term in order to highlight the difference between Kant’s and
Fichte’s  views  on pure  apperception,  self-reflection  and self-consciousness.  Firstly,  it  will  be
considered whether “können” is redundant in the Kantian account. Secondly, it will studied the
hypothesis that this term represents probability. Thirdly, it will be discussed why Fichte finds
Kant’s argument to be unsatisfactory. As a conclusion, it will be argued that Kant’s “können”
ruins the unity of the I or subject that is central for Fichte.
INDEX
Keywords: Kant, Fichte, I, pure apperception, deduction of the categories
AUTHOR
MICHIHITO YOSHIME
Osaka University
The Problem of “können” in Kant’s B-Deduction and Its Significance for Fichte
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 17 | 2018
8
